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The Effectiveness of Co-Determination 
Laws in Cooperative and  
Adversarial Employment Relations: When 
Does Regulation Have Bite? 
 
 
Abstract: The German Codetermination Law grants workers of establishments with 200 or 
more employees the right to have a works councillor who is fully exempted from his or her 
regular job duties while still paid his or her regular salary. We analyse theoretically and em-
pirically how this de jure right to exemptions translates into de facto practice, and we explic-
itly take into account the nature of the employment relations participation regime. We find 
that the right of exemption has no effect in cooperative employment relations because ex-
emptions are granted even in the absence of legal rights, but does make a difference in ad-
versarial relations when exemptions are only granted above the threshold where legal rights 
force employers to do so, i.e., legal rights do make a decisive difference in exactly those sit-
uations when the legislators’ intent would not be realised without the right to legal enforce-
ment. 
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1. Introduction 
While the German Codetermination Law1 grants the right of exemption from all regular job 
duties for a works councillor in establishments with 200 or more employees, it is not clear 
whether this legal threshold of 200+ translates into a factual one. Until recently, the literature 
assumed an immediate “jump” at that legal threshold from zero to one in the probability that 
a works councillor is exempted from his or her regular job duties (see, e.g., Koller et al. 
2008). However, as Mohrenweiser and Backes-Gellner (2010) recently showed in their em-
pirical investigation this does not in fact occur. This raises the question whether such legal 
regulations do not have enough “bite” to fulfil the legislator’s intent of giving works council-
lors in larger enterprises more time to better perform their participatory tasks.2  
In this paper, we argue that by explicitly taking into account the nature of the employment 
relationship we are able to provide a new explanation for this somewhat puzzling empirical 
result. We provide a theoretical model that takes into account that, in practice, management-
works council relations are heterogeneous, and that, as a result, the employment relations in 
a firm may either be more cooperative or more adversarial.3 Based on our model, we argue 
that in cooperative employment relations, works councillors will be exempted by their firms 
even in the absence of legal rights, and hence we should not observe an effect of the legal 
                                                 
1 Codetermination Laws in Germany, and German works councils in particular, have received considerable 
attention in the industrial relations literature (see, e.g., Addison et al. 2004; Jirjahn and Smith 2006), but most 
of the work has concentrated on works council effects (see, e.g., Heywood and Jirjahn 2009a; Hirsch et al. 
2010; Hübler and Jirjahn 2003; Mueller 2011) and – more recently – on the establishment of works councils 
(e.g., Jirjahn 2009; Mohrenweiser et al. 2012).  
2 Marsden (2012) shows that legal rights and actual participation patterns depend not only on the legal regula-
tion but also on complementary factors at the firm level. He finds that legally based representative voice ap-
pears to act as a complement to individual voice. Conversely, voluntary voice tends to act as a substitute for 
individual voice. However, unlike our study, Marsden does not distinguish between different types of employ-
ment relations (cooperative versus adversarial) when looking at the relation between legal rights and actual 
participation patterns. To the contrary, Hann and Teague (2012), analysing the role of employment tribunals, 
come to the conclusion that the influence of law is steadily growing, and that legalistic and rights-based actions 
play a key role in the functioning of employment relations systems in Anglo-saxon countries – even in an arena 
where they should probably not play such a big role. 
3 Our distinction is similar to what Rolfsen (2011) calls traditional (employment) relations on the one hand vs. 
labour-management partnership on the other. Moreover, our theoretical analysis is motivated by Jirjahn and 
Smith (2006: 650) and Nienhueser (2009) who each argue that different employment relations may lead to very 
different outcomes. 
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threshold. We rather expect a steady increase in exemptions with firm size—starting even in 
the smallest firms because it is in the employers’ and the employees’ best interest to do so to 
foster mutual gains from their employment relationship. To the contrary, in adversarial rela-
tions, we argue that exemptions will only be granted above the threshold where legal rights 
literally force employers to do so because employers are most concerned about protecting 
their share of the rent. Thus, there should be a strong exemption effect at the legal threshold 
in adversarial employment relations. I.e. only in a situation when the legislators’ intent 
would not be realised without the right to legal enforcement we do expect legal rights to de-
velop their bite. When empirically analysing the effectiveness of employment laws it is 
therefore absolutely crucial to distinguish between different types of employment relations 
because otherwise one would infer wrong conclusions on the effectiveness of labour regula-
tions.  
De jure, the German Codetermination Law states that while works councillor posi-
tions in general are intended to be uncompensated and honorary posts (§37 I BetrVG), larg-
er-sized employers are required to release works council members from their job duties 
while continuing to pay their salaries “should it be necessary for proper fulfilment of their 
tasks when taking into consideration size and type of the establishment” (§37 II 1 2.HS Be-
trVG). Specifically, paragraph 38 BetrVG states that in establishments with 200 and more 
employees (the legal threshold), at least one member of the works council is to be put on a 
paid leave of absence.4 The number of works councillors to be put on paid leaves of absence 
then rises in accordance with establishment size.5  
                                                 
4 The costs of a complete paid leave of absence for a works councillor at the threshold of 200 employees have 
been assessed by Schnabel and Wagner (2001) at 0.5% of total salaries. Friedrich and Hägele (1997) calculate a 
rise of direct works council costs from 98,000 Euros to 148,000 Euros per year on average when the threshold 
was lowered from 300 to 200 employees. 
5 In addition, for a firm with 501-901 employees two works councillors have to be exempted, for a firm with 
901-1,500 employees three works councillors, for a firm with 1,501-2,000 employees four works councillors, 
and for a firm with 2,001-3,000 employees five works councillors have to be exempted. From then on until a 
firm size of 10,000 employees, for every 1,000 additional employees one further works councillor has to be 
5 
De facto, the law only grants a right to exemption but does not prescribe it and leaves 
the initiative to the firms and their works councils. Thus, the question is under what circum-
stance can we expect employers or employees to have an interest in exempting works coun-
cillors from their regular work and when do legal rights make a difference. Our theoretical 
analysis is based on a combination of the work by Freeman and Lazear (1995) on the one 
hand and Kotthoff (1981, 1994) on the other, supplemented by additionally taking firm size 
into consideration. The work by Freeman and Lazear is central to our analysis because it 
distinguishes between two very different effects of worker representatives: positive alloca-
tive effects on the one hand and (from the perspective of employers) negative distributive 
effects on the other. This distinction forms the very basis of our analysis. While, however, 
Freeman and Lazear do not elaborate on the conditions under which allocative effects might 
be particularly strong and distributive effects only weak (or vice versa), combining the work 
by Freeman and Lazear with the one from Kotthoff who explicitly distinguishes between 
different types of works councils and employment relations, allows us to do so: Specifically, 
we argue that in cooperative employment relations, allocative effects will be rather strong 
and distributive effects rather weak, while in adversarial employment relations it will be the 
other way around. Taking further account of a potential leverage effect with increasing firm 
size, allows us to derive our hypotheses on the exemption of works councilors in cooperative 
vs. adversarial employment relations below or above the legal threshold. 
We empirically test our hypotheses using the works council data set of the Institute 
for Small- and Medium-Sized Enterprises (Bonn). Consistent with our theoretical hypothe-
ses, we find that in adversarial employment relations, the probability of works councillor 
exemption jumps at the legal threshold: it is zero below the legal threshold, then sharply rises 
at the legal threshold and afterwards increases with firm size. But, as also expected from our 
                                                                                                                                                      
exempted. Starting with a firm size of more than 10,000 employees, for every 2,000 additional employees one 
further works councillor has to be exempted,  
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theoretical analysis, in cooperative employment relations, we do not observe a jump in the 
probability of exemption at the legal threshold but rather observe a continuous increase with 
firm size. Hence, our results show that legal regulations, in our case the legal right of works 
councillor exemption, may have no effect when employment relations are cooperative, but 
will in fact make a decisive difference and will develop bite when employment relations are 
adversarial, i.e., when the legislators’ intent would not be realised without the right to legal 
enforcement. Thus, even if voluntarism is fine in many cases—be it because firms grant 
workers’ rights in their own interest or be it that the parties to the employment contract act in 
“the shadow of the law” (Bercusson 1994), in adversarial employment relations, the “bite” of 
an enforceable law is needed to make sure that workers’ rights are really strengthened (if that 
is what the legislator wants). 
While our analysis focuses on works councillor exemption, its implications go be-
yond this particular field of application. We find firms that voluntarily exempt works coun-
cillors from their regular responsibilities without legal obligation to do so and firms that fail 
to exempt works councillors in spite of a legal obligation to do so. For the former as well as 
for the latter, regulation apparently has no effect. Rather, the exemption of works councillors 
appears to depend on the nature of the employment relations participation regime—with reg-
ulation only, albeit reliably, affecting those firms where employment relations are adversari-
al. For all other firms, the probability of works councillor exemption steadily increases with 
firm size—hinting at a general leverage effect, rather than legal forces, at work in firms with 
cooperative employment relations. 
The structure of our article is as follows: First, we derive our theoretical hypotheses 
on the probability of exemption in cooperative versus adversarial employment relations for 
establishments below and above the legal threshold. Then, we present our empirical analysis. 
The final section concludes. 
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2. Theoretical Background and Hypotheses 
2.1 Linking Works Councils Effects, the Nature of Employment Relations, and 
Firm Size 
In their theoretical analysis of works councils, Freeman and Lazear (1995) differentiate 
between two potential works council effects, allocative and distributive. The allocative ef-
fects refer to works councils’ potential to increase the size of the pie or rent to be distributed, 
while the distributive effects refer to the share of the pie that each party receives.  
Allocative effects have repeatedly been shown to exist (e.g., Addison et al. 2001, 2004; 
Hübler and Jirjahn 2003, or most recently for unions by Bryson, Forth and Laroche 2011) 
and can take several forms. Works councils might enhance intra-firm cooperation and com-
munication by improving the information flow from employees to management and vice 
versa. They might legitimise management decisions, optimise production and business pro-
cesses, and increase employee motivation, resulting in higher productivity and less fluctua-
tion. Furthermore, works councils’ information and co-determination rights might render 
management information more reliable and help articulate employee interests (Freeman and 
Lazear 1995; Mohrenweiser et al. 2012). 
At the same time, distributive effects of works councils’ activities have also repeatedly 
been shown to exist (Hübler and Jirjahn 2003; Mueller 2011; or for union distributive effects 
Bryson, Forth and Laroche 2011). Distributive effects do not influence the size of the pie to 
be distributed but rather the share of the pie that is allotted to the workers or left over for the 
employer. The employer’s share might be reduced by improving working conditions, grant-
ing additional fringe benefits, pension funds, increasing on-the-job consumption (Heywood 
and Jirjahn, 2009a) or the like or as a result of the direct costs of work council activities 
(e.g., office space, election costs, etc.). Thus, although German works councils do not en-
8 
gage in regular wage bargaining, they can actively influence rent distribution by other 
means. 
However, while we know from the sociological case study-based literature (beginning 
with Kotthoff 1981) that management-works councils relations are in practice heterogeneous 
and that employment relations participation regimes range from cooperative to adversarial, 
the potential interrelation between employment relations participation regimes, and their 
allocative and distributive effects has barely been analysed as yet. Among the notable excep-
tions are the studies by Dilger (2002, 2006) and – most recently – Pfeifer (2011a, 2011b) 
who each analyse whether the effects of works councils depend on works council “type”.  
However, Freeman and Lazear do not take into account firm size as a determinant of the 
allocative versus distributive works council effects. In our theoretical explanation, we argue 
that both the nature of the employment relations participation regime and firm size are poten-
tial determinants of the allocative and distributive effects and discuss how the interrelation of 
these factors might impact whether works councillors are exempted from their regular duties 
or not.  
First, regarding the nature of employment relations, we differentiate between two basic 
“types” of employment relations participation regimes: cooperative relations and adversarial, 
conflict-oriented ones. While, according to the analyses by Kotthoff (1981, 1994), in practice 
there will most certainly be more than two different “types” of works councils or employ-
ment relations participation regimes, we use this highly stylized categorization because of its 
methodological tractability. In cooperative relations, works councils are assumed to concen-
trate on activities that are apt to enlarge the pie to be distributed (trusting that in the end they 
will also receive a fair share of what has been generated). In adversarial relations, to the con-
trary, works councils will typically concentrate on securing a fair share of the rent rather than 
engaging in activities that might help increase the rent (which in the end will only accrue to 
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the employer and not benefit the employees).6 Hence, we argue that in cooperative employ-
ment relations, works councils will typically concentrate on their allocative role, whereas in 
conflict-laden, adversarial employment relations, they will focus on distributive goals. While 
these assumptions would seem to be highly stylized, the recent empirical evidence gained by 
Pfeifer (2011a) supports this seemingly simplistic view. 
Extending the argumentation by Pfeifer (2011a), we further argue that exempting works 
councillors from their regular job responsibilities (and granting them paid leaves of absence) 
will allow them to devote more time and energy to their activities and therefore more easily 
reach their respective goals. Hence, in cooperative employment relations, works councillors 
released from their regular job duties will invest more heavily in their allocative role, as they 
are more able to obtain detailed information and effectively exercise their rights to contribute 
to the common goal. However, works councillors who find themselves in conflict-laden em-
ployment relations will invest more heavily in their distributive role when exempted from 
their regular duties. 
Second, with regard to the effect of firm size on works council effects, it seems plausible 
to assume that the potential for allocative effects in a cooperative environment increases with 
firm size as the result of a typical leverage effect: I.e., the more people cooperate and work 
together towards a joint goal, the greater the total effect, not only on the total rent, but also 
on the rent per employee. A single employee who increases cooperation with the employer 
will certainly have a positive effect; however, if 100 or 1,000 employees increase their coop-
eration, enhance their communication and work harder towards a joint goal, their total effect 
will be more pronounced and disproportionately greater. Hence, the allocative effects of 
works councils can be expected to disproportionally increase with firm size. While the rent 
                                                 
6 Similarly, Bryson, Forth & Laroche (2011) show that performance effects of unions also depend on institu-
tional differences (which they study in an international comparison). Since in our data set all establishments are 
in one country we abstract from analysing such effects. 
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per employee might well increase with firm size even in a situation without a works council 
(as a result of economies of scale, e.g.), in adversarial relations economies of scale might not 
be fully exploited. Further, there might be additional scale effects or other productivity en-
hancing effects resulting from cooperative employment relations where employees are will-
ing and eager to boost the potential of a given technology. If employees are not cooperative, 
however, potential economies of scale cannot be fully exploited, and this loss will be larger 
the larger the firm. The evidence by Addison et al. (2001) that works councils’ positive al-
locative effects on firm productivity are especially found in larger establishment render em-
pirical support to this view.7 
Figure 1 illustrates the relation between firm size and works council effects for coopera-
tive employment relations (panel A) and adversarial employment relations (panel B): In both 
types of employment relations participation regimes, the total rent per employee increases 
with firm size, so does the share of the total rent per employee which goes to the employer. 
However, in cooperative employment relations (panel A), the slope of the total rent per em-
ployee for any given firm size is larger than in adversarial relations as a result of the support-
ive works council. The total rent per employee increases more steeply with firm size because 
of the leverage effect resulting from more workers cooperating and enhancing allocative 
efficiency. In adversarial employment relations (panel B), to the contrary, works councillors 
neglect their allocative role (i.e. the total rent per employee is lower and increases less steep-
ly in firm size) and rather concentrate on their distributive role resulting in a lower share of 
the rent per employee going to the employer as works councils in adversarial employment 
                                                 
7 Of course, also transaction costs and frictions increase with firm size. However, this does not change our main 
argument but rather strengthens it because in a situation of increased transaction costs and friction losses due to 
diverging interests, it should become even more valuable for the firm to be able to bargain with employee rep-
resentatives instead of having to bargain individually with a large number of increasingly diverse employees. 
Thus, in cooperative employment relations, having an effective works council will be more profitable for the 
employer the larger the firm. Since more and more heterogeneous employees obviously also means that a 
works councillor will have to invest more time in talking to more employees and finding out about their needs, 
this provides a strong incentive to the employer to exempt works councillors from their regular jobs even below 
the legal threshold – of course, only if employment relations are cooperative. 
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relations use their power to secure a larger share of the rent for the workers. As a conse-
quence, the employer’s share of the rent per employee, i.e. the shaded area in Figure 1, is 
substantially lower for any given level of firm size in adversarial (panel B) than in coopera-
tive employment relations (panel A), and it increases less steeply with firm size. 
Figure 2 visualizes the hypothesized effects of exempting a works councillor from his 
regular job, again for the case of cooperative (panel A) and adversarial employment relations 
(panel B). In cooperative employment relations (panel A), exempting a works councillor 
from his or her regular job helps the works council to fulfil its productivity increasing alloca-
tive role and leads to a further increase in the total rent per employee and—as a conse-
quence—also in the employer’s share. Due to the leverage effect, the positive allocative ef-
fect resulting from works councillor exemption increases with firm size.8 Thus, firms in their 
own interest have an incentive to grant exemptions to their works councillors because their 
benefits due to the allocative effects are larger than their costs due to the distributive effect. 
This incentive gets stronger the larger the firm, i.e. the more there is to gain from the per-
spective of the employer. To the contrary, the exemption of a works councillor in adversarial 
employment relations (panel B) allows the works council to even more successfully pursue 
its distributive goals—leading to a further reduction in the employer share of an already 
smaller total rent per employee. Consequently, in adversarial employment relations, the em-
ployer does not have an incentive to voluntarily exempt works councillors from their regular 
jobs and will only do so when legally forced to.  
 
2.2 The Role of the Legal Threshold and Hypotheses 
                                                 
8 However, one might argue that not only the number of exempted works councillors increases with firm size, 
but also the number of non-exempted works councillors and that these non-exempted works councillors, too, 
will contribute to the positive allocative effects – in case employment relations are cooperative. The idea is that 
in cooperative employment relations, the exempted works councillors leverage the positive allocative potential 
of the other workers in general – and the positive allocative potential of their non-exempted co-works council-
lors in particular.  
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According to legal regulations, there are two possibilities for whether and when a works 
councillor is exempted from his or her regular duties: (1) In firms with less than 200 em-
ployees, the employer has discretion to decide whether works councillors are granted paid 
leave; and (2) in firms with 200 or more employees, the employer must exempt at least one 
member of the works council from his or her regular tasks while continuing to pay his or her 
salary. 
(I) Below the legal threshold of 200 employees where the firm can unilaterally decide 
whether to exempt a works councillor from his or her regular job, we expect to observe the 
following: 
- In adversarial employment relations, exempting a works councillor is not advanta-
geous for the employer because the works councillor will invest more in his or her 
distributive activities. Hence, firms will refrain from voluntarily exempting works 
councillors from their regular duties in adversarial employment relations.  
- In cooperative employment relations, however, firms expect increasing returns with 
increasing firm size if works councillors are granted paid leaves of absence. The 
larger the firm, the greater the effect of a works councillor who is able to concen-
trate on his or her supportive activities and the higher the returns due to increasing 
allocative efficiency. In cooperative firms, the employer and the employees also 
find a cooperative way to share the resources; consequently, we expect a general 
pattern that the larger the firm, the greater the probability that a works councillor is 
exempted from his or her regular duties. 
(II) At and above the legal threshold of 200 employees, employees and works council-
lors are in a position to exercise their right to exemption. We expect to observe the follow-
ing: 
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- In cooperative employment relations, the ability of works councillors to exercise 
their right to exemption has no effect because the employer generally benefits from 
granting a paid leave of absence with increasing firm size and will thus readily 
grant such leaves above the threshold. Thus, in cooperative employment relations, 
we will observe a further steady increase in the probability of exemption above the 
legal threshold. 
- In adversarial employment relations, however, we expect the probability of works 
councillor exemption to increase drastically above the threshold because even if the 
employer will not exempt a works councillor from his or her regular duties, works 
councils will enforce their legal rights because doing so helps them obtain a larger 
share of the rent (as works councillors who can devote all their time to works coun-
cil responsibilities are more effective in achieving this objective). As enforcing 
one’s rights will still be costly, we do not expect the probability of exemption to 
jump to a probability of one instantly once the legal threshold is reached. Rather, 
above the threshold we anticipate a gradual increase in the probability of exemption 
with the size of the firm because the greater the number of employees, the higher 
the likelihood that additional shares of resources will make up for the costs of such 
battles to enforce these rights.  
Thus, we make the following two hypotheses:  
Hypothesis 1: In adversarial employment relations, the probability of exemption (a) is zero 
below the legal threshold, (b) “jumps” at the legal threshold, and (c) further increases with 
firm size above the legal threshold (see Figure 3).  
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Hypothesis 2: In cooperative employment relations, the probability of exemption (a) does not 
“jump” at the legal threshold and (b) increases steadily with firm size over the whole firm 
size distribution (see Figure 4).  
3. Empirics 
3.1 Data and Variables 
Data. We use a data set of the Institute for Small- and Medium-Sized Enterprises, 
IfM-Bonn. This cross-sectional data set is based on a manager survey on employment rela-
tions in general and works councils in particular in establishments with 20 to 500 employees 
from the year 2005. The data are representative of establishments of this size (for more de-
tails, cf. Schlömer et al. 2007). The data set is ideal to test our hypotheses due to its detailed 
information on codetermination and a large number of related questions on managerial is-
sues. Particularly, our data set contains information on the incidence of works councillor 
exemption from their regular duties and the nature of the relationship between works coun-
cils and management. Given that we are interested in the determinants of paid leaves of ab-
sence for works councillors, but not on works councils per se, we restrict our data set to es-
tablishments with works councils, leaving 231 establishments for which we have infor-
mation on all the variables that we use in our regressions.  
Definition of variables. Table 1 gives the definitions and the descriptive statistics for 
our dependent variable as well as our explanatory and control variables. 
As our dependent variable, we use a dummy variable indicating whether at least one 
works councillor is fully exempted from his or her regular tasks (works councillor exemp-
tion).94 In approximately 25% of the establishments in our sample works councillors are ful-
ly exempted from their regular duties. 
                                                 
9 In addition to establishments with employees on “full” paid leaves of absence, there are also some establish-
ments with employees on part-time leave. We include only “full” paid leave as our dependent variable for the 
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One of our important explanatory variables is whether the establishment under con-
sideration is below or above the legal threshold (200+ employees), above which a paid leave 
of absence is granted by law. Slightly over 43% of the establishments in the sample are 
above the legal threshold. In addition, we use the metric variable lnsize to study size effects 
above and below the legal threshold (robustness checks are given below and in Table A1).  
The variable bad employment relations is based on the question “How would you de-
scribe the relation between management and works council in your establishment” that par-
ticipants answered on a Likert scale from “1” (very bad) to “5” (very good). As our data 
stems from IfM-Bonn survey of managers, the information on whether employment relations 
are judged to be rather good or bad refers to the managerial and not the works council per-
spective, which can be quite different as shown e.g. by Helfen and Schuessler (2009). How-
ever, for our research question this seems to be the perspective that is relevant. Since our 
research question focusses on the employer’s decision to exempt or not to exempt a works 
councillor, the managerial perspective on the nature of the employment relation should be 
crucial. If management considers the employment relation to be cooperative, it is willing to 
grant rights voluntarily, but if it considers employment relations to be adversarial, it will not 
grant additional rights. For our empirical analysis, we created a dummy variable “bad em-
ployment relations” for establishments answering “1” (very bad) or “2” (bad). In our sample, 
approximately 11% of the establishments consider their employment relations to be bad10  
(see Table A2 in the Appendix for the distribution of the initial answers).11  
                                                                                                                                                      
following three reasons: (a) “part-time” leave may be minor, (b) we have no information on the number of 
leave hours, and (c) part-time leave is not subject to the legal regulations that interest us.  
10 Of course, this number is only to be seen as a snapshot at a given point of time. Descriptive statistics for 
2013 would probably show other, maybe lower numbers as employment relations might have become more 
adversarial during the latest recessions. 
11 With reference to our basic theoretical assumption that in bad employment relations, works councils concen-
trate on their distributive role and less on their allocative one, we find the following: Confronted with the item 
“The works council improves the quality of decisions” hinting at a substantial allocative role of works councils, 
only 4% of managers in establishments with bad employment relations fully agree or agree, while more than 
26% of managers in establishments with good employment relations fully agree or agree. In contrast, confront-
ed with the item “The works council is a source of union strength” and highlighting the distributive role of 
16 
Furthermore, we use a large number of control variables whose influence on works 
council incidence, attitude and effects (Addison et al. 1997; Jirjahn and Smith 2006) has 
been demonstrated in the past (for a complete list of variables used, cf. Table 1). Among 
others, we control for collective bargaining as this has been shown to influence both, alloca-
tive (Hübler and Jirjahn 2003) as well as distributive works council effects (Mueller 2011). 
3.2 Results 
Probit estimates. In this section, we analyse the determinants of works councillor ex-
emption based on a series of probit models, with the likelihood of works councillor exemp-
tion as the dependent variable and 200+employees and/or lnsize as explanatory variables, as 
well as the additional control variables from Table 1. Our empirical analyses start with a set 
of regressions for all firms (Table 2) to see whether there is a jump in paid leaves of absence 
at the legal threshold—as one would naively expect from a look at the de jure regulations. 
As long as we do not distinguish between good and bad employment relations there is no 
jump in the likelihood of paid leaves of absence for works councillors at the legal threshold 
(the coefficient of the variable “200+employees” is insignificant), which is in line with pre-
vious results not distinguishing between different types of employment relations.  
However, if we split the sample and run separate regressions for good and bad em-
ployment relations, as suggested by our theoretical analysis, we come to different and more 
meaningful results and conclusions. When we first look at establishments with good em-
ployment relations (models II to IV in Table 2), we again find that there is no jump in the 
likelihood of works councillor exemption at the legal threshold (200+employees), which 
supports hypothesis 2a. Further, we find that the likelihood steadily increases with firm size 
                                                                                                                                                      
works councils, 48% of managers in establishments with bad employment relations fully agree, while a com-
paratively lower percentage of managers in establishments with good employment relations (28%) fully agree. 
This result is mirrored in the overall evaluation of works councils as being either detrimental or beneficial. 
While 52% of managers in establishments with bad relations judge their works councils to be detrimental, less 
than 2% of managers in establishments with good relations do so. In total, the chosen operationalisation of “bad 
employment relations” hence seems to express our theoretical construct quite well. 
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(lnSize is significantly positive in models II, III and IV) and we find that the increase above 
the legal threshold is not larger than below the threshold (no significant coefficient of the 
interaction term between 200+employees and lnSize in model IV),12 supporting hypothesis 
2b. Thus we can conclude that whereas from a de jure perspective one would always expect 
exemptions to jump at the threshold, we find that de facto in cooperative employment rela-
tions, the probability of paid leaves of absence increases steadily with firm size over the en-
tire firm size distribution – starting way below the threshold.  
When we next look at firms with bad employment relations we find very different 
patterns. Looking at the descriptive distribution of works councillor exemption (cf. Table 3) 
one very obvious result is that there is no single establishment below the legal threshold that 
exempts at least one of their works councillors—although approximately half of the estab-
lishments with bad employment relations are below the legal threshold—which strongly 
supports hypothesis 1a. On the other hand, looking at probit estimations for the firms above 
the legal threshold (cf. Table 4)13 we find that the coefficient of lnSize is significantly posi-
tive, i.e. in adversarial employment relations above the legal threshold, the probability of 
exemption increases with firm size as stated in hypothesis 1c. Thus, there is a jump in the 
likelihood of paid leave of absence at the legal threshold, with a likelihood of zero below the 
threshold and a significantly positive increase in firm size above the threshold, which sup-
ports hypothesis 1c. Thus we can conclude that when looking at bad employment relations, 
we find that what we expect from a de jure perspective is congruent with what we observe de 
facto, i.e. the probability of paid leaves of absence is virtually zero below the legal threshold 
and makes a large jump at the legal threshold of 200 employees and grows steadily after-
wards. Legal regulations develop their bite in adversarial employment relations and lead to a 
                                                 
12 We show later that the marginal effects of the cross-derivate are indeed positive. Moreover, we undertook a 
series of robustness checks (see Table A1 in the Appendix) supporting our results. 
13 The regression contains only the twelve firms above the legal threshold, as there are no establishments with 
bad employment relations below the legal threshold that exempt works councillors from their regular duties. 
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jump in exemptions as soon as the legal threshold is reached, while at the same time in coop-
erative employment relations there is no jump at the legal threshold. 
To better illustrate these effects, we plot in figure 5 the predicted probabilities of 
works councillor exemption based on model III in Table 2.14 We see that in firms with bad 
employment relationships, the predicted probability of works councillor exemptions sharply 
increases above the threshold and reaches a likelihood of close to one in establishments with 
not even 400 employees. To the contrary, in firms with good employment relations the pre-
dicted probability of a works councillor exemption increases monotonically over the whole 
firm size distribution. The probability is approximately 15% in establishments with 150 em-
ployees, 30% in establishments with 250 employees and 60% in establishments with 400 
employees. So overall, different types of employment relations make an economically im-
portant difference in works councillor exemptions. De jure one would expect a jump of ex-
emptions at the legal threshold of 200, de facto we only observe such a jump for firms with 
bad employment relations. 
Additionally, Figure 6 displays the raw descriptive results for the proportion of estab-
lishments exempting works councillors from their regular duties for all establishments (Panel 
A), establishments with bad relations (Panel B) and establishments with good relations (Pan-
el C). 
Robustness checks. To determine whether our result that there is no jump in the proba-
bility of a works councillor exemption in establishments with good relations is robust, we 
first ran a number of robustness checks with alternative specifications for firms with good 
                                                 
14 We use the predicted probabilities because our preferred model entails interaction variables. Interpreting 
marginal effects of interaction variables in nonlinear models remains highly controversial. Marginal effects 
provide a sense of practical importance, but the functional form of a non-linear model implies that all explana-
tory variables have nonlinear effects on the probability of interest. Calculating marginal effects of interaction 
variables requires distributional assumptions. Therefore, we interpret the interaction effects with respect to the 
cross derivative of the underlying latent variable and, hence, focus solely on the statistical significance of the 
coefficient of the interaction variable (compare also Heywood and Jirjahn, 2009b for a discussion of this strate-
gy). 
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relations (cf. Table 5). We test several firm-size specifications and find robust effects. Only 
in the case when we exclude all but the legal threshold variable 200+employees, we find a 
significant effect for the legal threshold dummy. However, this effect only reflects that the 
average probability below the threshold is lower than the average probability above the 
threshold and thus only mirrors the result of the steady increase found in previous estima-
tions that is now split into two parts: smaller firms with on-average lower probability of ex-
emption and larger firms with on-average higher probability of exemption. Hence, above all, 
this result shows how a misspecification of the model may suggest an effect of a legal 
threshold that is in fact only a statistical artefact.  
Second, we regress only the main explanatory variables (model 2 in Appendix Table A1) 
and further estimate a model that uses a set of covariates but excludes all other employment 
relations variables besides the variable for “bad employment relations” (model 3 in Appen-
dix Table A1). As a further robustness check, model 1 in Appendix Table A1 uses an addi-
tional category for good or very good employment relations. In all of the regressions, the 
probability of a works councillor exemption increases with firm size, and the legal threshold 
has no effect.  
As a final robustness check, we address the problem of a potential sample selection bias, 
as the existence of a works council may be endogenous and is most likely correlated with 
firm size (Jirjahn 2009; Mohrenweiser et al. 2012). To do so, we estimate a sample selection 
model fitting the determinants of the existence of a works council and the determinants of 
exemption (see Table A3 in the Appendix). Our findings remain robust to this specification 
test. 
Taken together, our results provide strong support for our theoretical explanation and 
hypotheses. However, our results cannot provide evidence of a causal effect because we do 
not have panel information and therefore cannot entirely rule out reverse causality. 
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4. Conclusion 
The German Codetermination Law grants the right to a paid leave of absence to a works 
councillor in establishments with 200 or more employees. In our paper, we add to the litera-
ture in showing that legal regulations do not automatically guarantee that granted rights are 
actually effective. Our theoretical analysis is based on a combination of the work by Free-
man and Lazear (1995) on works council effects on the one hand and Kotthoff’s (1981, 
1994) work on different types of employment relations on the other, supplemented by addi-
tionally taking into account of a potential leverage effect with respect to firm size. While 
Freeman and Lazear do not elaborate on the conditions under which allocative effects might 
be particularly strong and distributive effects only weak (or vice versa), combining the work 
by Freeman and Lazear with the one from Kotthoff allows us to do so: Specifically, we ar-
gue that in cooperative employment relations, allocative effects will be rather strong and 
distributive effects rather weak, while in adversarial employment relations it will be the other 
way around. Taking further account of a potential leverage effect with increasing firm size, 
allows us to derive our hypotheses on the exemption of works councillors in cooperative vs. 
adversarial employment relations below or above the legal threshold. 
In our empirical analysis, we find that whether codetermination regulation has an effect 
crucially depends on the nature of the employment relations participation regime, with regu-
lation primarily affecting firms where employment relations are adversarial. In firms with 
cooperative employment relations, to the contrary, the probability of works councillor ex-
emption steadily increases with firm size and remains unaffected by the legal threshold – 
hinting that a general leverage effect, rather than legal forces, is at work. Thus, although the 
exemption regulation has no effect in cooperative employment relations it does develop bite 
in adversarial relations, i.e., when the legislators’ intent would not be realised without the 
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right to legal enforcement. Voluntarism is fine in many circumstances  because firms grant 
workers’ rights in their own interest or because the parties act in “the shadow of the law” 
(Bercusson 1994). In adversarial employment relations, however, the “bite” of an enforcea-
ble law strengthen workers’ rights (if that is what the legislator wants).Concerning practical 
implications from our analysis, the general message to the legislator (also in other industrial 
relations systems outside Germany and on supranational level) is that legal regulations 
strengthening workers’ rights (e.g. the European Works Council EWC) will only bite in ad-
versarial employment relations. Further, concerning practitioners, our study shows that for 
employers and employee representatives it might in fact pay to invest in cooperative em-
ployment relations because, in general, both parties will be better off: The rent will increase 
and so will the share that goes to the employer and the one that goes to the workers. In an 
adversarial situation where confrontations cannot be avoided, however, the legally enforced 
exemption of works councillors will strengthen workers’ rights and make sure that workers 
get their fair share when it comes to the distribution of the rent. However, even in such a 
situation, it will pay the parties to try to work in the direction of an increased cooperation, 
because this might start a self-reinforcing process of increasing rents and increasing shares 
for both parties. Here, consultants and unions might play an important role as they are not 
immediately involved in adversarial relations’ daily workplace struggles. 
Concerning implications for future studies, our study supports the claim put forward by 
Jirjahn and Smith (2006: 650) concerning the potential shortcomings of failing to differenti-
ate between cooperative and uncooperative employment relations participation regimes. 
Hence, much of the literature on works councils must be revisited because the measured ef-
fects may be invalidated if different employment relations participation regimes are taken 
into account. The previous literature could not distinguish between different employment 
relations regimes due to data limitations; our results, however, show that variations in em-
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ployment relations regimes are very important because the effects that we find are very dif-
ferent for different employment relations participation regimes. Thus, future research should 
address this problem by (a) theoretically distinguishing between different regimes and (b) 
empirically taking different regimes into account, e.g., by systematically including questions 
on the nature of the underlying employment relations participation regime in surveys.  
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Appendix 
Table A1: Robustness Checks 
 
All  
Firms 
(1) 
All  
Firms 
(2) 
All  
Firms 
(3) 
Good 
Relations 
(4) 
Good 
Relations 
(5) 
200+ Employees 0.315 (0.69) 
0.150 
(0.37) 
0.161 
(0.35) 
3.072 
(0.69) 
6.126 
(1.04) 
LnSize 2.208*** (4.30) 
1.938*** 
(4.54) 
2.170*** 
(4.36) 
2.136** 
(3.23) 
2.652** 
(2.67) 
200+ Employees * lnSize    -0.546 (0.64) 
-1.100 
(0.96) 
Bad Employment Relations -0.647 (1.42) 
-0.021 
(0.07) 
-0.067 
(0.20)   
Good Employment Relations -0.413 (1.22)     
Skilled Employees  -0.212 (0.33)  
-0.284 
(0.46)  
-0.634 
(0.94) 
Apprentices -1.803 (1.06)  
-0.625 
(0.42)  
-0.336 
(0.19) 
Part-Time Employees 0.429 (0.96)  
0.347 
(0.93)  
0.398 
(1.00) 
Female Employees -1.328 (1.94)  
-1.077 
(1.62)  
-1.852* 
(2.49) 
Employment Growth -0.280 (0.92)  
-0.254 
(0.88)  
-0.116 
(0.39) 
Collective Agreement 0.564* (2.00)     
Active Owner 0.020 (0.07)  
0.013 
(0.05)  
-0.054 
(0.17) 
Direct Participation 0.338 (1.19)     
Strong Support by Workforce -0.263 (0.84)     
Strong Influence of Unions 0.253 (0.89)     
Age of Works Council 0.004 (0.48)     
East Germany 0.329 (0.99)  
0.085 
(0.30)  
0.083 
(0.25) 
Industry Dummies yes Yes yes yes yes 
Constant -12.77*** (4.41) 
-11.09*** 
(5.26) 
-11.98*** 
(4.35) 
-12.05*** 
(3.68) 
-14.06** 
(2.67) 
Pseudo R-sqr 0.47 0.39 0.44 0.37 0.43 
Observations 231 231 231 206 206 
Coefficients of a Probit ML estimation. Robust Z-statistics are in parentheses. *** Statistically significant 
at 1%; ** statistically significant at 5%; * statistically significant at 10%.  
Source: IfM Bonn Works Council Survey 2005.  
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Table A2: Distribution of Managerial Valuation of the Management – Works Council Rela-
tion 
 Frequency % 
Very Bad 2 0.86 
Bad 23 9.95 
Neutral 49 21.21 
Good 117 50.65 
Very Good 40 17.32 
Total 231 100 
Source: IfM Bonn Works Council Survey 2005. 
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Table A3: Sample Selection Model8, Two-Stage Least Square Estimation 
 All Firms All Firms All Firms 
  First Stage Second Stage 
 (1) (2) (3) 
200+ Employees 0.148 0.015 0.313 
 (0.33) (0.03) (1.34) 
LnSize 2.232*** 2.004*** 0.581*** 
 (4.45) (3.45) (4.76) 
Skilled Employees  -0.324 -0.440 0.765** 
 (-0.51) (-0.71) (2.65) 
Apprentices -1.123 -1.054 0.304 
 (-0.68) (-0.48) (0.37) 
Part-Time Employees 0.255 0.189 0.284 
 (0.61) (0.41) (1.35) 
Female Employees -1.154 -0.949 -0.301 
 (-1.74) (-1.33) (-1.06) 
Employment Growth -0.258 -0.168 -0.407** 
 (-0.91) (-0.59) (-2.86) 
Collective Agreement 0.579* 0.378 0.728*** 
 (2.17) (1.14) (5.41) 
Active Owner 0.155 0.379 -1.089*** 
 (0.53) (1.13) (-7.66) 
Direct Participation 0.282 0.229 0.064 
 (1.05) (0.85) (0.45) 
East Germany 0.240 0.199 0.069 
 (0.80) (0.57) (0.43) 
Mills Ratio   -0.660 
   (-0.98) 
Constant -12.89*** -11.23*** -2.71*** 
 (-4.54) (-3.33) (-4.28) 
Industry Dummies yes yes yes 
Pseudo R-sqr/ LogLikelihood 0.46 -314.217  
Number of Observations 231 570 231 
Column 1 repeats the estimation of Table 2 without variables that are not observed in firms without a works 
council. Columns 2 and 3 show the first and second stages of a Heckman-type selection correction model iden-
tifying the selection effect with the functional form.  
Coefficients of a Probit ML estimation. Robust Z-statistics are in parentheses. *** Statistically significant at 
1%; ** statistically significant at 5%; * statistically significant at 10%. Source: IfM Bonn Works Council Sur-
vey 2005. 
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Table 1: Variable Definitions and Descriptive Statistics (N=231)  
Variable Description (Mean, Std. Dev.) 
Works Councillor  
Exemption 
Dummy variable equal to 1 if at least one works councillor is 
fully exempted from his or her regular duties (0.247, 0.432). 
200+ Employees Dummy variable equal to 1 if the establishment employs more 
than 200 employees (0.432, 0.496). 
LnSize Log of the number of total employees in the establishment 
(4.973, 0.769). 
Bad Employment  
Relations 
Dummy variable equal to 1 if management views the relation-
ship with the works council as being very bad or bad (0.108, 
0.311). 
Skilled Employees Employees with a university or apprenticeship degree as a pro-
portion of total employees (0.776, 0.218). 
Apprentices Apprentices as a proportion of total employees (0.052, 0.072). 
Part-time Employees Part-time employees as a proportion of total employees (0.217, 
0.314). 
Female Employees Women as a proportion of total employees (0.349, 0.248). 
Employment Growth Dummy variable equal to 1 if the establishment experienced a 
positive employment growth during the last three years (0.281, 
0.451). 
Collective Agreement Dummy variable equal to 1 if the establishment is covered by a 
collective bargaining agreement (0.615, 0.488). 
Active Owner Dummy variable equal to 1 if the establishment is managed by 
an active owner (0.351, 0.478). 
Direct Participation Dummy variable equal to 1 if there are other direct forms of 
worker involvement in decision making (0.429, 0.496). 
Strong Support by  
Workforce 
Dummy variable equal to 1 if the workforce strongly supports 
the works council (0.268, 0.444). 
Strong Union Influence Dummy variable equal to 1 if unions have strong influence on 
the works council (0.430, 0.497). 
Age of Works Council Time span between the survey year and the year the works 
council has been introduced (19.43, 16.38). 
East Germany Dummy variable equal to 1 if the establishment is located in 
East Germany (0.225, 0.419). 
Industry Dummies Industry dummies for manufacturing, construction, retail, logis-
tics & communication, services for companies, and services for 
private individuals  
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Table 2: Determinants of Works Councillor Exemption – All Establishments and Establish-
ments with Good Relations 
 All 
Firms 
Good  
Relations 
Good  
Relations 
Good  
Relations 
 (I) (II) (III) (IV) 
200+ Employees 0.248  0.539 6.969 
(0.55)  (1.16) (1.27) 
LnSize 2.185*** 2.224*** 1.806*** 2.714*** 
 (4.26) (6.88) (3.73) (3.02) 
200+ Employees * LnSize    -1.239 
   (1.17) 
Bad Employment  
Relations 
-0.375    
(0.98)    
Skilled Employees -0.236 -0.370 -0.463 -0.528 
 (0.37) (0.54) (0.66) (0.74) 
Apprentices -1.733 -1.394 -1.331 -1.404 
 (1.01) (0.76) (0.72) (0.74) 
Part-Time Employees 0.382 0.414 0.382 0.436 
 (0.88) (0.98) (0.91) (0.98) 
Female Employees -1.173* -1.698** -1.782** -1.920** 
 (1.78) (2.38) (2.44) (2.57) 
Employment Growth -0.295 -0.138 -0.166 -0.156 
 (0.99) (0.45) (0.55) (0.51) 
Collective Agreement 0.534* 0.548 0.554* 0.542* 
 (1.92) (1.85) (1.86) (1.78) 
Active Owner 0.083 0.106 0.035 0.023 
 (0.28) (0.35) (0.11) (0.07) 
Direct Participation 0.329 0.224 0.230 0.220 
 (1.18) (0.76) (0.78) (0.75) 
Strong Support by Workforce -0.348 -0.291 -0.328 -0.339 
(1.16) (0.98) (1.11) (1.14) 
Strong Union Influence  0.311 0.299 0.331 0.368 
(1.12) (1.04) (1.15) (1.25) 
Age of Works Council 0.004 0.002 0.002 0.003 
 (0.44) (0.26) (0.19) (0.27) 
East Germany 0.365 0.265 0.290 0.332 
 (1.15) (0.76) (0.83) (0.90) 
Industry Dummies Yes Yes Yes Yes 
Constant -
12.905*** 
-
12.763*** 
-
10.742*** 
-
15.228*** 
 (4.46) (6.05) (3.95) (3.13) 
Pseudo R-sqr 0.47 0.46 0.46 0.47 
Observations 231 206 206 206 
Coefficients of a Probit ML estimation. Robust Z-statistics are in parentheses.  
*** Statistically significant at 1%; ** statistically significant at 5%; * statistically significant at 10%.  
Source: IfM Bonn Works Council Survey 2005. 
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Table 3: Establishments with Bad Relations and Works Councillor Exemption 
 Less than  
200 Employees 
More than  
200 Employees 
Total 
No Paid Leaves of Absence 13 5 18 
Paid leaves of absence  0 7 7 
Total 13 12 25 
Source: IfM Bonn Works Council Survey. 
 
 
Table 4: Determinants of Works Councillor Exemption – Establishments with Bad Relations 
above Legal Threshold 
LnSize 6.226** 
 (2.40) 
Constant -35.443** 
 (2.40) 
Pseudo R-sqr 0.46 
Observations 12 
Coefficients of a Probit ML estimation. Robust Z-statistics are in parentheses.  
*** Statistically significant at 1%; ** statistically significant at 5%; * statistically significant at 10%.  
Source: IfM Bonn Works Council Survey 2005. 
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Table 5: Determinants of Works Councillor Exemption, Establishments with Good Rela-
tions – Robustness Checks 
 (I) (II) (III) (IV) (V) (VI) 
200+ Employees  0.163   -0.068 2.087*** 
  (0.31)   (-0.13) (7.48) 
LnSize 23.301** 21.181*     
 (2.13) (1.76)     
LnSize squared / 1000 -1.925* -1.745     
 (-1.95) (-1.63)     
Firm Size   0.009*** 0.037*** 0.038***  
   (7.40) (4.73) (3.49)  
Firm Size squared / 1000    -0.051*** -0.053***  
    (-3.83) (-3.10)  
Controls Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes 
Pseudo R-sqr 0.48 0.48 0.42 0.48 0.48 0.39 
Number of Observations 206 206 206 206 206 206 
We use the same control variables as in the regressions of Table 2 column (II) to (IV).  
Coefficients of a Probit ML estimation. Robust Z-statistics are in parentheses.  
*** Statistically significant at 1%; ** statistically significant at 5%; * statistically significant at 10%.  
Source: IfM Bonn Works Council Survey 2005. 
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Figure 1: Employer Rent and Firm Size in Cooperative vs. Adversarial Employment Rela-
tions 
 
Panel A: cooperative Panel B: adversarial 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Figure 2: The Effect of Exemption in Cooperative vs. Adversarial Employment Relations 
Panel A: cooperative        Panel B: adversarial 
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Figure 3: Expected Probability Pattern of Exemptions in Adversarial Employment Relations 
(H1). 
 
Figure 4: Expected Probability Pattern of Exemptions in Cooperative Employment Rela-
tions (H2). 
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Figure 5: Works Councillor Exemption – Predicted Probabilities.  
 
The predicted probabilities of works councillor exemption for establishments with good relations are predicted 
by using the estimated coefficients in column (III) of Table 2. The probabilities for establishments with bad 
relations are predicted using the estimated coefficients of Table 4. All of the other control variables are as-
sumed to be at their mean levels. N= 231.  
Source: IfM Bonn Works Council Survey. 
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Figure 6: Proportion of Establishments with Works Councillor Exemption 
Panel A: ALL ESTABLISHMENTS 
 
Panel B: ONLY ESTABLISHMENTS WITH BAD EMPLOYEE RELATIONS 
 
Panel C: ONLY ESTABLISHMENTS WITH GOOD EMPLOYEE RELATIONS 
 
Panel A: all establishments (N=231)  
Panel B: establishments with bad employment relations (N=25)  
Panel C: establishments with good employment relations (N=206).  
Source: IfM Works Council Survey 2005. 
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